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This review paper attempts to update the literature on tolerance of ambiguity (TA) and related concepts 
since a previous review (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995). Various related concepts like Uncertainly Avoid-
ance and In/Tolerance of Uncertainly are reviewed. Both correlational and experimental studies of TA are 
reviewed and tabulated. Further, an attempt was made to identify and critique various different question-
naires design to measure TA. Recommendations for the use of these tests in research are made. The rea-
sons for progress and lack of progress in this field are highlighted. 
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Introduction 
The concept of tolerance of ambiguity (TA), which was 
originally developed by Frenkel-Brunswik (1948), has attracted 
a great deal of research over the last 60 years (Merrotsy, 2013). 
Her paper, that related TA to authoritarianism, has since been 
cited nearly 10,000 times (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levin-
son, & Sanford, 1950). TA has generally been conceived as a 
personality variable or individual difference factor (Budner, 
1962) and has been used in a variety of applied fields, including 
clinical psychology (Lachance et al., 1999), medicine (Geller et 
al., 1993) and organisational behaviour (Judge et al. 1999). This 
paper attempts to update review by Furnham (1994) and Furn-
ham and Ribchester (1995) on the conceptions, correlates and 
measurement of TA.  
History of the Concept 
Frenkel-Brunswick (1949) defined TA as an “emotional and 
perceptual personality variable”. She was influenced by the 
work of Jaensch (1938) whose work was to influence many 
others (Eysenck, 1954). She concluded: “In the present paper, 
an attempt was made to discuss denial of emotional ambiva-
lence and intolerance of cognitive ambiguity as but different 
aspects of what may be a fairly coherent characteristic. An 
underlying emotional conflict between glorification and hostil-
ity in the attitude towards parents, sex and one’s own social 
identity previously demonstrated in children inclined toward 
rigid social dichotomizing as revealed by ethnic prejudice is 
taken as the impetus for experiments in memory, perception, 
and related topics, devised to test tolerance of ambiguity on an 
emotionally more neutral ground. There is some indication of a 
prevalence of premature reduction of ambiguous cognitive 
patterns to certainty in the prejudiced subjects, as revealed by a 
clinging to the familiar, or by a superimposition of one or many 
distorting cliches upon stimuli which are more manageable in a 
more simple and stereotyped fashion. There is some indication 
that in the case of distinct intolerance of emotional ambivalence 
one may as a rule be able to locate at least some aspects of in-
tolerance of cognitive ambiguity although these may often by 
more apparent on a higher level than that of perception paper.” 
(p. 140). 
Frenkel-Brunswick (1951) set out many behavioural features 
of TA including resistance to reversal of apparent fluctuating 
stimuli; the early selection and maintenance of one solution in a 
perceptually ambiguous situation; inability to allow for the 
possibility of good and bad traits in the same person; accep-
tance of attitude statements representing a rigid; black-white 
view of life; seeking for certainty; a rigid dichotomising into 
fixed categories; premature closure, and remaining closed ex-
cept to familiar characteristics of stimuli. Thus TA was con-
ceived as a salient, multi-faceted predictive variable in a variety 
of behavioural settings. 
Frenkel-Brunswick’s (1949, 1951) definition of the concept 
was generated by case study material gleaned from interviews 
of persons high or low on this construct. She argued that TA 
generalises to the various aspects of emotional and cognitive 
functioning of the individual, characterising cognitive style, 
belief and attitude systems, interpersonal and social functioning 
and problem solving behaviour. She also related TA to other 
personality variables, predicting a positive relationship with the 
authoritarian family of personality traits. Since then the topic 
has attracted considerable research and remains a well-used 
variable to this day (Anderson & Schwartz, 1992; Merrotsy, 
2013). 
Early Studies 
Many of the early studies in this area were psychometric 
studies that attempted to construct a valid, self-report, measure 
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of TA. Budner (1962) defined TA as “the tendency to perceive 
ambiguous situations as desirable” and set about one of the first 
measures in the field. Budner’s (1962) paper has been cited 
over 1000 times. McLain (1993) included contextual informa-
tion, defining TA as “a range, from rejection to attraction, of 
reactions to stimuli perceived as unfamiliar, complex, dynami-
cally uncertain or subject to multiple conflicting interpreta-
tions” (p. 184).  
There has expectedly been debate on the dimensionality of 
the TA concept. Durrheim and Foster (1997) propose that TA is 
a context-specific construct, not a personality trait, and others 
advocate the use of contextualised measures (Herman, Stevens, 
Bird, Mendenhall, & Oddou, 2010). 
TA is however usually measured on a one-dimensional scale: 
those who are intolerant of ambiguity are described as having a 
tendency to resort to black-and-white solutions, and character-
ised by rapid and overconfident judgement, often at the neglect 
of reality (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949). At the other end of the 
scale, ambiguous situations are perceived as desirable, chal-
lenging and interesting, usually by individuals who score highly 
on an Openness to Experience scale (Caligiuri, Jacobs, & Farr, 
2000) and show both sensation-seeking and risk-taking behav-
iour (McLain, 1993; Lauriola, Levin, & Hart, 2007; McLain, 
2009).  
Generally for those with low TA there is an aversive reaction 
to ambiguous situations because the lack of information makes 
it difficult to assess risk and correctly make a decision. These 
situations are perceived as a threat and source of discomfort. 
Reactions to the perceived threat are stress, avoidance, delay, 
suppression, or denial (Budner, 1962; MacDonald, 1970; McLain, 
1993; Furnham & Ribchester, 1995). 
In more recent work researchers have altered their focus to-
wards examining how TA influences the perception of situa-
tions and decision making (Yurtsever, 2001, 2008; Van Hook 
& Steele, 2002; McLain, 2009). Instead it is thought that con-
structs that are defined by an absence of information (e.g. 
risk-taking behaviour) are more relevant and are more useful 
validating TA measures. 
The TA research literature appears to have three different 
features: there have been work on similar concepts to TA which 
is discussed below; there have been an increase of experimental 
over correlational studies; and a more of an interest in the ef-
fects of TA in the work environment. 
Conceptual and Definitional Issues 
Other similar concepts have been described which are clearly 
very similar to TA like Uncertainty Avoidance and Risk-Taking 
Propensity. Hofstede (1984) recognised uncertainty avoidance 
as a characteristic of cultures and developed an uncertainty 
avoidance index. The distribution of the personality variable 
“uncertainty avoidance” has been studied in different societies, 
thus making it a “sociological variable”, where uncertainty 
avoidance was defined as “the extent to which people feel 
threatened by ambiguous situations, and have created beliefs 
and institutions that try to avoid these” (p. 419). Most research-
ers interested in uncertainty avoidance are cross-cultural or 
organisational psychologists who are interested in comparing 
groups of individuals, rather than seeing it as an individual 
preference or trait. As a consequence, these researchers seem 
not to have developed many self-report measures of uncertainty 
avoidance. 
There is also a clinical literature on Tolerance of Uncertainty 
(TU) which has been conceived of as a cognitive disposition 
that confers risk of Generalised Anxiety Disorder (Birrell, 
Meares, Wilkinson & Freeston, 2011). Various self-report mea- 
sures have been developed which are often validated against 
measures of anxiety, depression and worry (Carleton, Norton & 
Asmundson, 2007). TU is associated with worries and negative 
expectations of the future and is therefore often involved in 
research of anxiety disorders (Ladouceur et al., 2000). TU is 
usually measured using the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
(Freeston et al., 1994), which is made up of 27 items. Its inter-
nal consistency is high, α = 0.91 and Dugas et al. (1997) re-
ported a test-retest reliability of 0.78 over a five week period. 
The scale is used as a clinical tool in the diagnosis of GAD 
(Freeston et al., 1994). It continues to be examined for its psy-
chometric properties (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Fergus & Wu, 
2012). 
Green and Roger (2001) argued that there is a clear relation-
ship between TA and TU but that the former is used primarily 
in cognitive studies on decision-making, memory and percep-
tion “all of which are oriented towards cognitive processes 
rather than stress and emotion” (p. 521). They developed a 
three factor scale two factors of which (emotional uncertainty 
and cognitive uncertainty) were modestly correlated (respec-
tively: r = .18 and r = .37, N = 204). In their review of the fac-
tor analytic studies of the best known scale in the area, Birrell 
et al (2011) found evidence of two factors: Desire for Predict-
ability and Active Engagement in Seeking Certainty; and Pa-
ralysis of Cognition and Cognition in the Face of Uncertainty. 
The TA, TU and uncertainty avoidance concepts have been 
used interchangeably (Stewart, Carland, Carland, Watson, & 
Sweo, 2003; McLain, 1993; Majid & Pragasam, 1997; Grenier, 
Barrette, & Ladouceur, 2005) but efforts have been made to 
show that the concepts are not identical. Ellsberg (1961) de-
fined ambiguity as a lack of information that is necessary to 
understand a situation or to identify all of the possible out-
comes. Krohne (1989, 1993) concluded that whilst ambiguity is 
a property of the stimulus, uncertainty is the emotional state 
that is provoked by it. Grenier et al. (2005) argued that the main 
difference between TA and TU is the time frame referred to. 
TA describes a trait that focuses on an individual’s reaction to 
an ambiguous situation in the present. TU, on the other hand, 
describes a future-orientated trait, where the individual is re-
acting to the uncertainty of the future. This discrimination 
partly explains why the TA and TU literature tend to have sep-
arate areas of focus. TA is used in the cognitive and experi-
mental literature and TU in the clinical literature. 
Risk-taking propensity is also very similar to TA (McLain, 
2009). Lauriola, Levin and Hart (2007) argue that there is a 
stable dispositional trait that underlies risky decision making 
and decision making under ambiguity in experimental tasks. 
Ellsberg (1961) distinguished decisions under ambiguity from 
risky decision making in terms of knowledge of outcomes and 
probabilities: Behavioural decision scientists usually define 
ambiguous decision making as a situation in which there is an 
unknown distribution of outcome probabilities for at least one 
of the options. Whereas the probabilities are known in risky 
decision-making, but outcomes are not.  
However it remains true that despite work on these subtly 
different and related concepts there is still no very clear opera-
tional definition of TA at the facet level or a clear differentia-
tion between the manifestations and correlates of TA. Nor has 
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there been any strong theoretical development in the area. Both 
may account for the steady, but uninspiring, developments in 
the area. 
Correlational Studies 
There have been many attempts to look at the concurrent, 
convergent and discriminant validity of TA with studies corre-
lating scores with other established measures. Most of the work 
in this area remains correlational. 
The relationships between TA and other personality variables 
have been supported by correlations in self-report question-
naires and has been used to validate scales of TA. Budner’s 
(1962) 16-item scale positively correlated with authoritarianism 
and this was used as evidence of construct validity. Mac-
Donald’s (1970) AT-20 correlated with Rokeach’s dogmatism 
scale and the Walk’s A Scale correlated with ethnocentrism 
(O’Connor, 1952). 
Correlations also exist with other forms of measurement of 
TA. Million (1957) measure TA by the autokinetic phenome-
non and found a relationship with authoritarianism. However 
despite some evidence for this relationship, research has not 
always proved conclusive. For example, Feather (1969) found 
that the Budner scale’s measurement of TA did not relate to 
dogmatism. 
We set about an extensive search for all TA and TU papers 
published since 1995. Many simply mentioned the concepts, 
and we decided to review only those which had actually used a 
measure of TA or TU in the research. We then decided to tabu-
late the results showing the range of papers published, what 
measures they used and what they found. These are shown in 
Table 1 where 30 studies are reviewed. 
Because details of the studies are provided in the table the 
results will not be considered in detail. Rather, four observa-
tions from this research effort can be summarised. First, they 
use a wide range of measures of TA, not all of which correlate 
very highly with each other. Second, many have modest popu-
lation groups, though a number have populations over 200. 
Third, the number of variables correlated with measures of TA 
were extremely varied from art preference, though identity 
conflict to thinking style. There seemed no thematic or pro-
grammatic effort on any research group in this area. Correla-
tions tended to be modest. Fourth, most studies had their hy-
potheses confirmed showing how TA was conceptually related 
to a variety of other measures and behaviours. 
Experimental Work 
There have also been one or two experimental studies in this 
area. However they have been the exception rather than the rule. 
For instance Lauriola and Levin (2001) designed an ecologi-
cally valid experiment that compared attitudes towards ambigu-
ity and risk. They showed that differences in attitude towards 
ambiguity are consistent with attitudes towards risk, in that a 
preference for the ambiguous predicts a preference for a risky 
options. However on further inspection, the relationship only 
proved significant when participants were avoiding a loss in the 
Risky Decision-making Task as opposed to seeking a gain. It 
was concluded that the extra processing in the “loss” condition 
meant that attitudes towards ambiguity were more important in 
the decision-making procedure.  
Lauriola, Levin and Hart (2007) repeated this experiment and 
found that the Ambiguity-Probability Tradeoff task negatively 
correlated with a TA self-report questionnaire (MSTAT-I) (r = 
−.15; p < 0.05) as well as optimism scores on the Life Orienta-
tion Test-Revised, and positively correlated with regret-based 
decision style. A high score on this task predicted subsequent 
risky choices in a follow up study a month later. It was also 
predictive of later ambiguous choices in a different domain. 
These findings support the existence of a stable dispositional 
trait underlying reactions to risk and ambiguity. 
The Measurement of TA 
Given that the TA construct has been around for so long, it is 
no surprise that a number of measures exist (see Table 2). To 
date we have found 8 self-report measures. However we ac- 
knowledge other, unpublished, tests are recorded (Saunders, 
1955) or those where little psychometric work was attempted 
(Eysenck, 1954). Eysenck’s early measure was a simple 14- 
item true-false test but appeared to have good concurrent valid- 
ity. He reported on a non-verbal pictorial intolerance of ambi- 
guity test which was 8 drawings of a dog turning slowly and by 
degrees into a cat. The predicted and confirmed hypothesis was 
that rigid people would continue to cling to the original “dog” 
concept long after it had turned into a cat.  
Most of the tests of TA are however self-report question-
naires. One of the best known and well used scales in this area 
was developed 30 years ago by Budner (1962) who devised a 
16-item (half positive, half negative) scale which was described 
in great detail. He argued that each item had to tap at least one 
postulated indicator of perceived threat, namely phenomenol-
ogical submissions or denial, operative submission or denial. 
Items referred to one of either of three types of ambiguous 
situations: novelty, complexity and insolubility. The scale was 
validated on 17 different, mainly student, populations and 
shown to be free of acquiescent and social desirability response 
tendencies. Although the test correlation was good (0.85 over 2 
months) the internal alpha was poor (0.49). Various forms of 
validity were examined including concurrent and construct.  
Budner’s scale was correlated with rankings of individuals 
on the basis of short biographies, peer ratings, and measures of 
conventionality, belief in divine power, attendence at religious 
services, dogmatism about religious beliefs and attitudes to 
censorship. The total scale also correlated positively with au-
thoritarianism, idealism of and submission to parents, Machia-
vellianism, career choice in medical students etc. Not all the 
correlations were significant and most were in the 0.20 to 0.40 
range but they were sufficiently consistent to suggest that the 
measure had content, concurrent and construct validity. The 
wording of items in this scale have been criticised for their 
failure to represent the appropriate stimulus, or even suggest 
ambiguity at all (McLain, 2009). The items are also argued to 
be confounded by reference to specific situation, which may 
elicit misleading reactions. Budner saw TA as a “non-specific” 
trait that does not lead to specific behaviours or evaluations that 
are not manifestations of TA itself.  
The Budner scale has perhaps attracted most attention and is 
used most frequently in TA research. Rydell and Rosen (1966) 
and Rydell (1966) reported on the development and validation 
of another scale. The scale consisted of 16 true-false items 
which had been constructed on a “a-priori basis” (Rydell & 
Rosen, 1966: p. 151) with relatively limited validation. Test- 
etest reliabilities over a month with 41 students yielded an r =  r 
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Table 1. 
Table showing TA measures. 
Authors N TA measure Outcome measure r/p values Findings 
Thalbourne et al. (2000) 100 AT-20 Transliminality r = −0.02 Transliminality did not correlate with TA. 
Litman, (2010) 372 AT-20 
Dispositional interest (I)-type 
curiosity; Deprivation (D)-type 
curiosity; Anxiety; Anger; 
Depression 
r = 0.36; −0.15; 
−0.02; 0.03; −0.15
AT-20 scale was positively correlated with I-type 
curiosity and negatively correlated to D-type 
curiosity and anger. 
Weisbrod, (2009) 157 AT-20 Ethical decision making p = 0.018, < 0.01
Low TA predicts less willingness to violate 
ethical norms in both personal and organizational 
settings. High TA subjects were more likely to 










Willingness to pay for  
remanufactured goods p < 0.001; p < 0.001
Consumers’ TA positively correlated with their 
willingness to pay for remanufactured products; 
TA positively correlated with perceived quality 
of remanufactured products. 
Bardi, Guerra,  





(UTS; Dalbert, 1999) 
Openness r = −0.42, p < 0.01; r = −0.25, p < 0.01
Intolerance of ambiguity negatively correlated 
with openness. 






(UTS; Dalbert, 1999) 
Challenge appraisal r = −0.12, p < 0.05 Intolerance of ambiguity negatively correlated with challenge appraisal. 
   Life satisfaction r = −0.14, p < 0.05; r = −0.15, p < 0.05
Intolerance of ambiguity negatively correlated 
with life satisfaction. 
   Positive affect r = −0.24, p < 0.01; r = −0.18, p <0.01
Intolerance of ambiguity negatively correlated 
with positive affect. 
   Threat appraisal r = 0.30, p < 0.01 Intolerance of ambiguity positively correlated with threat appraisal. 
   Negative affect r = 0.33, p < 0.01 Intolerance of ambiguity positively correlated with negative affect. 
   Anxiety r = 0.38, p < 0.01 Intolerance of ambiguity positively correlated with anxiety. 
Teoh & Foo, (1997) 70 AT-20 Entrepreneurial performance p < 0.07 TA moderates the relationship between role conflict and performance measures. 
Teoh & Foo, (1997) 70 AT-21 Entrepreneurial performance p < 0.01 High TA correlates with better performance. 
Lal & Hassel, (1998) 64 Budner’s TIA 
Perceived usefulness of  
information characteristics of 
management accounting  
systems (MAS) 
p < 0.05 
Managers with high TA perceive 
non-conventional MAS as more useful when 
perceived environmental uncertainty is high than 
those with low TA. 
   
Perceived usefulness of  
information in accounting 
systems (MAS) 
p < 0.01 TA has a stronger effect on MAS in large firms than small firms. 
Firoozabadi, & Bahredar, 
(2006) 240 Budner’s TIA 
Medical students’  
demographics p < 0.05 Men scored lower than women on the TA scale.
   Medical speciality preference n/a There was no difference in TA level between medical speciality preferences. 




Perceived effect of dissonance 
in online learning 
p = 0.002;  
p = 0.015 
Learners from low TA cultures felt it was  
important for their instructors to take into act 
their cultural background and that they be 
informed about differences between  
their culture and that of the course. 
   Perceived effect of dissonance in online learning p = 0.007 
High TA cultures reported being more motivated 
to learn whilst low TA cultures were intimated. 
   Perceived effect of dissonance in online learning p = 0.047 
High TA cultures had higher participation rates 
(controlling for language). 
   Perceived effect of dissonance in online learning 
p = 0.168; p = 0.05; 
p = 0.216; p = 0.212
No significant differences regarding their  
instructor’s awareness, consideration culture, 
silenced experiences and feelings of  
alienation for the TA dimension. 
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Chong, (1998) 63 AT-20 
Managerial perforance  
(via management accounting 
systems (MAS) information)
TA and MAS,  
r = 0.381 MAS X 
TA: p = 0.012 
TA is negatively correlated with MAS, which has 
a direct effect on managerial perfomance. 
Hartmann & Slapnicar, 
(2012) 178 AT-20 
Justice perceptions with the use 
of outcome measures r = 0.318, p < 0.001
Managers with low TA judge an evaluation 
process more fairly. 
Swami, Stieger, Pietschnig 
& Voracek, (2010) 240 MAT-50 Preference for surrealist art
r = −0.22, p < 0.05; 
r = −0.22, p < 0.05;
r = −0.25, p < 0.001
TA positively correlates with a liking for  
surrealist art (TA subscales: Philosophy,  
Problem-solving, Art Forms). 
   Preference for surrealist films r = −0.19, p < 0.05; r = −0.18, p < 0.05
TA positively correlates with a liking for  
surrealist films (TA subscales: Problem-solving, 
Art Forms). 
Rong & Grover, (2009) 126 MAT-50 Technological knowledge renewal effectiveness (t = 2.32, p = 0.01)
TA has a positive impact on technological 
knowledge renewal effectiveness. 
Iyer, McBride, & Reckers, 
(2012) 78 AT-20 
Capital investment proposal 
recommendation  
(with/without a decision aid)
F = 5.09, p = 0.027 Low TA Ss applied decision aids when making a decision on an ambiguous investment. 
Buhr & Dugas, (2006) 197 Budner’s TIA Intolerance of uncertainty r = 0.42, p <0.001 TA has a positive correlation with tolerance of uncertainty. 
   Worry r = 0.27, p < 0.001 TA has a negative relationship with worry. 
   Self-oriented perfectionism r = 0.19, p < 0.01 TA has a negative relationship with self-oriented perfectionism. 
   Socially-prescribed  perfectionism r = 0.35, p < 0.001
TA has a negative relationship with  
socially-prescribed perfectionism. 
   Other-oriented perfectionism r = 0.15, p < 0.05 TA has a negative relationship with other-oriented perfectionism. 
   Perceived mastery r = -0.14, p < 0.05 TA has a positive relationship with perceived mastery. 
   Perceived constraints r = 0.32, p < 0.001 TA has a negative relationship with perceived constraint. 
   Age r = −0.24, p < 0.01 TA increases with age. 
Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, 
Bischoff & Mischo, (1999) 374 
The Scale of  
Interpersonal  
Intolerance of  
Ambiguity (SIA) by 
Wolfradt and  
Rademacher 
Schizotypal personality  
disorder 
r = 0.27, p < 0.001; 
r = 0.25, p < 0.001; 
r = 0.43, p < 0.001
TA has a negative relationship with Schizotypal 
personality disorder (cognitive-perceptual,  
interpersonal and disorganizational deficits). 
   Information processing  (need for cognition) r = -0.19, p < 0.001
TA has a positive relationship with this type of 
information processing (need for cognition). 
   General Self-Efficacy r = −0.31, p < 0.001 TA has a positive relationship with general self-efficacy. 
Furnham & Avison, (1997) 62 AT-20 Painting preferences r = 0.31, p < 0.05 TA is significantly related positively to surrealist (fewer elements) paintings. 
Ironside, Jefferies &  
Martin, (2009) n/a 
The Multiple  
Stimulus Types  
Ambiguity Tolerance 
Scale-I (MSTAT-I) 
Achievement of patient safety 
competencies p > 0.05 
TA did not correlate with nurses’ patients safety 
competencies. 
Leong & Ward, (2000) 106 MSTAT-I Identity conflict r = −0.32, p < 0.005 High TA is a significant predictor of identity in Chinese sojourners in Singapore. 
Le, Haller, Langer,  
Courvoisier, (2012) 75 Budner’s TIA Mindfulness r = −0.35, p < 0.01 TA positively correlated with mindfulness. 
   Thinking style r = −0.54, p < 0.01; r = −0.43, p < 0.01
TA positively correlated with thinking style 
(mean; concrete). 
   Affect r = −0.01; r = 0.13 TA did not correlate with pre-experimental  (positive or negative) affect. 
Westerberg, Singh & 
Häckner, (1997) 139 
Modified from Lorsch 
and Morse Firms’ financial performance b = 0.26, p < 0.01
CEOs with high TA were related to firms with 
high financial performance. 
   Firms’ market performance b = 0.26, p < 0.01 CEOs with high TA were related to firms with high market performance. 
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   Firms’ market orientation p > 0.05 CEOs’ TA did not correlate with firms that  emphasize planning orientation. 
   Firms’ planning orientation p > 0.05 CEOs’ TA did not correlate with firms that  emphasize market orientation. 
Richardson, Jain & Dick, 
(1996) 582 Budner’s TIA Private brand proneness p > 0.05 
TA did not correlate with private brand  
proneness. 
   Value for money perceptions of private label brands. β = −0.117, p < 0.05
TA positively correlates with money perceptions 
(value for money). 
   Reliance on extrinsic cues in quality assessment. β = 0.251, p < 0.05
TA had a negative relationship with reliance on 
extrinsic cues in quality assessment. 
Altinay, Madanoglu, 
Daniele & Lashley, (2012) 205 
Acedo and Jones 
scale: modified from 
Lorsch and Morse 
Intention to start a business r = 0.274, p > 0.05 There was no relationship between TA and  intention to start a business. 
   Risk-taking propensity r = 0.318, p = 0.426 There was a positive relationship between  tolerance of ambiguity and risk taking propensity.
Caligiuri, Tarique, (2012) 641 Modified Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) 
Non-work cross-cultural 
experiences r = 0.28, p < 0.01
TA correlated positively with non-work 
cross-cultural experiences. 
   Organization-initiated cross-cultural experiences r = 0.06, p < 0.01
TA correlated positively with “organization- 
initiated” cross cultural experiences. 
   Dynamic cross-cultural  competencies R
2 = 0.26, p < 0.01 TA correlated positively with dynamic cross-cultural competencies. 
   Neuroticism r = 0.07, p > 0.05 TA did not correlate with neuroticism. 
   Extraversion r = 0.37, p < 0.01 TA had a strong, positive correlation with  extraversion. 
   Agreeableness r = −0.19, p < 0.05 TA correlated negatively with agreeableness. 
   Openness r = 0.29, p < 0.01 TA had a strong, positive correlation with  openness. 
   Conscientiousness r = 0.00, p > 0.05 TA did not correlate with conscientiousness. 
Neill &Rose, (2007) 167 Modified MSTAT-I Equivocality t = 0.27, p < 0.01 An organisations TA correlates with  equivocality. 
   Market-focused  strategic flexibility t = 0.21, p < 0.01
An organizations TA is positively correlated with 
market-focused strategic flexibility. 
Rajagopal & Hamouz, 
(2009) 111 Budner’s TIA 
Willingness to try (A factor of 
the Food Attitude Behavior 
Openness Scale (FABOS)) 
r = 0.332, p < 0.01 TA positively correlated with the factor  “willingness to try”. 
   Seeking novelty (FABOS) r = 0.447, p < 0.01 TA positively correlated with the factor  “seeking novelty”. 
   Enjoy novelty (FABOS) r = 0.212, p > 0.01 TA did not correlate with the “enjoy novelty” factor. 
   Conditional openess (FABOS) r = 0.098, p > 0.01 TA did not correlate with the “conditional  openness” factor. 
   Internationalization decisions p < 0.05 CEOs’ international orientation did not relate to TA. 
   Risk associated with  internationalization p < 0.001 
CEOs with high TA perceived lower levels of 
risk. 
   Proactive disposition to  internationalization p < 0.05 
TA did not correlate with a proactive disposition 
to internationalization. 
Carter & Hall, (2008) 279 Budner’s TIA Observational Test of  Ecological Sensitivity p < 0.05 
TA and openness to experience gave a combined 
score to assess cognitive openess, which  
correlated significantly positively with the  
Observational Test of Ecological Sensitivity. 
Gurel, Altinay, & Daniele, 
(2010) 206 
Acedo and Jones 
(2007) = modified 
Lorsch and Morse 
(1974) 
Entrepreneurial intention p > 0.05 TA was not associated with intentions to start a business. 
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Table 2. 
Table showing measures of the TA scales. 
Author Name of scale N No. of items Dimensions 
Herman, Stevens, Bird, Mendenhall, Oddou, 
(2010) The tolerance of ambiguity scale 2351 12 (1) 4 
McLain (2009) Multiple stimulus types ambiguity tolerance scale-II (MSTAT-II) 870 13 (1) 3 
Buhr & Dugas (2002) Intolerance of ambiguity scale 276 27 4 
Lange & Houran (1999) Rasch model AT-20 110 18 1 
Durrheim & Foster (1996) Attitudinal ambiguity tolerance scale 421 45 4 
McLain (1993) Multiple stimulus types ambiguity tolerance scale-I 148 22 1 
Norton (1975) MAT 50 1496 61 8 
MacDonald (1970) AT-20 789 20 1 
Budner (1962) 16 item scale 947 16 1 
O’Connor (1952) Walk Unpublished 8 1 
 
0.71 and with 105 students over 2 months r = 0.57 but there 
was no evidence of the test’s internal reliability. The test was in 
part validated with the use of semantic differential ratings of 
contradictory and non-contradictory adjective-noun concept 
combinations (Rydell, 1966). MacDonald (1970) however, 
attempted some psychometric evaluation of the Rydell-Rosen 
scale but added 4 extra items. This larger scale had a test-retest 
reliability of 0.63 over 6 months and was cross-validated on 
nearly 800 undergraduates. The test was correlated with 
Rokeach’s dogmatism scale, the Gough-Sanford Rigidity scale 
and church attendence but not social desirability. The split-half 
reliability was also satisfactory at 0.73, and MacDonald noted 
that it“shows promise of being a useful instrument for the 
measurement and further investigation of ambiguity tolerance” 
(p. 797).  
Lange and Houran (1999) praised the AT-20 scale for its 
convergent validity and internal consistency, but argued that an 
Item Response Theory (ITR) framework have more appropriate 
scaling properties for use in structural modeling. 
In particular, they propose the Rasch (1960) model because 
“Rasch scaling requires no iterative estimation procedures” 
(p.468). The Rasch model AT-20 (Lange & Houran, 1999) only 
differentiates itself from the AT-20 from a scaling point of 
view—there are no additional items but two were removed. It 
provides no new information for evidence of validity. Results 
showed that the positive item-rest point biserial correlations 
provide evidence of the scale’s uni-dimensionality, correlations 
were consistent with the local independence assumption, the 
discrimination parameter values show the data fits with the 
Rasch model and the person fit to the Rasch model was satis-
factory. The sample size was large enough to yield an adequate 
item separation value (3.72), which indicates the estimated item 
locations have a KR-20 reliability index of 0.93. The internal 
consistency was 0.68 (KR-20), which is slightly lower than the 
value reported by MacDonald (1970) but still just about satis-
factory considering the number of items. The Rasch approach is 
said to differ to the classical test theory with respect to estimat-
ing tolerance of ambiguity and assessing the error of measure-
ment associated with such estimates. 
In the mid-1970s Norton (1975) argued that the extant pa- 
per-and-pencil measures of TA were “flawed by low internal 
reliability and the absence of adequate validity evidence” (p. 
607). This he believed was in part due to ambiguities associated 
with the term ambiguous which was used in 8 different ways to 
describe: multiple meanings; vagueness, incompleteness, frag-
mentation; as a probability; unstructured; lack of information; 
uncertainty; inconsistencies, contradiction, contraries and un-
clearness. He therefore developed a 50-item “measure” (MAT- 
50) which was tested seven times to develop high reliability 
which was r = 0.38 (Kuder-Richardson) and with a test-retest 
reliability of 0.86 after 10 - 12 weeks. He also attempted to 
determine 3 types of validity: content validity (through content 
analysis and faking studies), criterion-related (through correla-
tions with measures of dogmatism and rigidity) and construct 
validity (through measures of willingness to volunteer for an 
ambiguous study; aesthetic judgement; a content analysis of 
verbal behaviour and behavioural dramatisation). As predicted, 
high TA Ss tended to volunteer more for undefined experiments, 
to use different aesthetic judgements and be more dramatic in 
problem-solving groups. 
Norton (1975) ended his paper suggesting seven research 
questions the scale may be used to investigate most of which 
had been tested before but not when using a self-report TA 
measure: what is the cognitive process during an ambiguous 
situation; how can the information theorist account for ambigu-
ity; is it possible to use the measure of TA to help identify 
therapeutic problems; do groups prefer leaders who are TA; 
how is trusting behaviour related to TA: to what degree is TA 
culture bound; what is the function of TA in a conflict resolu-
tion situation.  
Nearly 40 years ago Lorsch and Morse (1974) argued that 
managers who often face ambiguous decisions have to be more 
willing to take risks. They developed a 7-item scale with the 
aim to test members of organizations, specifically managers’ 
TA. Therefore this scale has been prominent mainly in business 
journals and has been modified a number of times in order to fit 
more appropriately with researchers’ needs (Westerberg, Singh 
& Häckner, 1997; Acedo & Jones, 2007; Gurel, Altinay & 
Daniele, 2010; Caligiuri & Tarique, 2012). Among others, 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) reduced the number of items to  
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4, and reported an internal reliability of 0.57.  
Motivated by the psychometric weakness of widely used 
measures of TA, McLain (1993) developed a new 22-item 
measure called the Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Toler-
ance (MSTAT). McLain attempted to redefine TA so that the 
three conceptual perspectives of TA could be separately defined 
and integrated. These three concepts are: TA as a source of 
threat from novel, complex and insoluble stimuli (Budner, 
1962), ambiguity as term for second order probability (Ellsberg, 
1961), and TA as a link to the authoritarianism family (Fren-
kel-Brunswik, 1949). McLain defined TA as “a range, from 
rejection to attraction, of reactions to stimuli perceived as un-
familiar, complex, dynamically uncertain, or subject to multiple 
conflicting interpretations” (p. 184). A factor analysis of 148 
respondents supported a uni-dimensional model, a general tol-
erance for ambiguity. The scale was found to have good inter-
nal consistency, α = 0.86. Evidence of the scale’s concurrent 
validity for the scale comes from significant positive correla-
tions with other TA scales (Budner’s (1962) 16-item scale, 
Storey and Aldag’s (1983) 8-item scale and MacDonald’s 
(1970) 20-item scale as well as significantly correlating with 
willingness to take risks, receptivity to change and a negative 
correlation with dogmatism. The adequate psychometric prop-
erties and refined construct of this scale make it one of the more 
popular measures in recent times. 
In 2009, McLain refined the MSTAT scale. The MSTAT-II 
is a 13-item scale derived from the original 22 items. The re-
duced number of items means that respondents use less cogni-
tive resources completing the questionnaire. Items were re-
moved from the MSTAT-I on the basis of feedback from re-
searchers and respondents who used the questionnaire. The 
remaining items were kept if they added to the overall construct, 
correlated with the scale, and did not confound it through con-
text-specificity or incomprehensibility. The data was collected 
from a sample of university students and firefighter-emergency 
medical technicians (n = 870). The internal consistency reli-
ability was 0.83, which is good despite being slightly lower 
than the MSTAT-I. Three factors were identified by a factor 
analysis, however a scree plot showed a distinct first factor only. 
This factor corresponded to ambiguity tolerance in general and 
confirmatory factor analysis suggested the one-dimensional 
theoretical model is appropriate. 
McLain found that MSTAT-II correlated significantly and 
positively with MacDonald’s AT-20, sensation seeking, per-
ceived risk, perceived uncertainty, which provides evidence for 
concurrent validity. The scale correlated negatively with so-
matic tension and social desirability. The correlation with Bud-
ner’s scale however, was not significant. McLain argued that 
this finding may be due to the Budner scale’s low reliability 
and poor item wording. He later found that the Budner scores 
had a multidimensional structure and therefore should not be 
seen to undermine the strength of the MSTAT-II. Despite these 
arguments, it should be noted that the MSTAT-I did signifi-
cantly correlate with the Budner scale and it may be possible 
that because items have been removed, the MSTAT-II is less 
comprehensive. Therefore this scale is recommended over the 
MSTAT-I when space is limited or when participants could 
potentially become cognitively overloaded. 
Durrheim and Foster (1997) did not conceive TA as psycho-
logical trait, but as a content specific construct. This is consis-
tent with Frenkel-Brunswick’s (1949) original construct of TA 
as an “attitudinal variable”, which was not assumed to general-
ise across different social objects. Among others, Durrheim and 
Foster (1997) proposed that intercorrelations of TA measures 
are “spurious relationships between shared attitudinal scale 
content” (p. 741) and that the relationship is a methodological 
artefact. This accounts for the failure to correlate different ex-
perimental procedures (e.g. Million, 1957). They argue that 
factor analysis (e.g. Furnham, 1994) show TA to be multidi-
mensional and conclude that there is little evidence for regard-
ing TA as a stable and generalised personality trait.  
Durrheim and Foster (1997), who are social, not personality, 
psychologists, developed the Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance 
scale (AAT) in response to these objections, which is based on 
the uni-polar scaling procedure that was originated by Kaplan 
(1972) and subsequently used by Scott and colleagues to assess 
ambivalence (Scott, 1966, 1969; Scott, Osgood, & Peterson, 
1979). The scale uses a wide range of authority figures as scale 
items and participants are asked to express their degree of am-
bivalence. This scale measures evaluative performance and is 
therefore thought to model Frenkel-Brunswick’s original de-
scription of prejudiced and non-prejudiced children. The scale 
was found to have an adequate internal reliability (α = 0.81) 
and test-retest reliability (r = 0.66). A factor analysis revealed 
four factors, which suggests a multi-dimensional structure and 
supports the original hypothesis. Evidence for concurrent valid-
ity for this scale comes from a significant positive correlation 
with the Ambivalence scale that the AAT was based on.  
The AAT scale was not significantly correlated with Bud-
ner’s scale, however this is inconclusive because not only is the 
Budner scale thought to lack reliability and validity, but there 
are theoretical underlying differences between the two scales. 
Criterion groups were also used to validate the AAT scale be-
cause of the political context in South Africa at the time of 
testing. Although Durrheim and Foster’s criticisms of the TA 
concept seem valid, they have largely been ignored by con-
temporary research for three reasons. Firstly, the focus of the 
TA concept has shifted away from prejudice and authoritarian-
ism and moved towards reactions in response to insufficient 
information. Secondly, the psychometric qualities of TA scales 
have increased. Third, empirical research supports a one-di- 
mensional theoretical model (McLain, 2009; Benjamin et al. 
1996; Furnham & Ribchester, 1995), which describes TA as 
“unitary yet multifaceted” (Herman et al., 2010: p. 59). 
It should be noted that Wolfradt and Rademacher (1999) de-
veloped and validated a scale for interpersonal TA. This scale 
was designed for use as a clinical tool. The scale is not widely 
used however, despite good internal reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.86; Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff, & Mischo, 
1999). 
Herman et al. (2010) proposed a new measure of TA that 
aimed to better understand its link to cross-cultural phenomena, 
improved conceptual dimensionality and psychometric evi-
dence. They attributed the disagreement in construct dimen-
sionality to the diversity of research contexts, arguing that 
overly general items may not be suitable for all the diverse 
concepts of TA. The MSTAT-II may suffer from over-gener- 
alisation, although the author admitted this himself (McLain, 
2009). 
Instead, Herman et al. (2010) reasoned that context-depend- 
ent measures should be developed in areas that may have prob-
lems if they use the generalised conception. Their measure 
focuses on cross-cultural contexts. They used Budner’s (1962) 
conceptualisation and measure of TA (because it has been so 
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influential despite its flaws) as a basis on which they performed 
an exploratory factor analysis, assessment of internal consis-
tency and item-total correlations, then added and removed 
items to improve the measure (n = 2351). The new items were 
designed to fit with prior conceptions of TA (Budner, 1962; 
McLain, 1993) and relevant to a cross-cultural context. They 
found the overall internal consistency to be acceptable (α = 
0.73). Factor analysis distinguished 4 factors, but the measure 
was found to fit a one-dimensional theoretical framework be-
cause the internal consistencies of the individual dimensions 
were not high enough to support multidimensionality. The four 
factors were; valuing diverse others, change, challenging per-
spectives and unfamiliarity. Valuing diverse others has not 
appeared in other recent conceptualisation (McLain, 1993, 2009; 
Furnham, 1994), which the authors relate to the interpersonal 
nature of cross-cultural settings. This 12-item scale is a useful 
tool for measuring TA in cross-cultural contexts and it may 
revolutionise the measurement of TA, starting a trend in the 
development of context-specific measures. 
It should be noted that Wolfradt and Rademacher (1999) de-
veloped and validated a scale for interpersonal TA. This scale 
was designed for use as a clinical tool. The scale is not widely 
used however, despite good internal reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.86; Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff, & Mischo, 
1999). 
Conclusion 
The TA concept has gone through changes since its concep- 
tion in 1948, when it was synonymous with authoritarianism 
and prejudice. The focus has now shifted to reflect the contem- 
porary definition of ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1962). Researchers 
have ducked the questions about where TA sits in Big Five 
Factor space. Is TA a second or third order facet or does it be- 
long outside the big five a little like Locus of Control or other 
“cognitive personality variables”? 
The papers in this area still lack sophistication. For instance 
there appear to be no studies that have attempted to determine 
the heritability of TA. This would help differentiate between 
the social psychological conception of TA as a set of attitudes 
vs the differential psychology conception of a stable, perhaps 
even biologically based trait. Nor have the tests been frequently 
subjected to structural equation modelling to determine both the 
facets or factors of TA as well as its determinants. However, 
the interest among clinicians in the TU concept may suggest 
that it is closely linked positively to Neuroticism and negatively 
to Openness-to-Experience. 
The interest in TA seems to have shifted from differential 
and social psychologist to clinical and organisational psycholo-
gists who see it as measure of adaptation and healthy function-
ing. There yet remains a need to do some psychometric house-
keeping as done by Furnham (1994) to look at the relationship 
between the existent measures, but perhaps more importantly to 
integrate TA measures and theory to modern psychometric 
methods as well as cognitive neuro-science. 
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